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Abstract— Two important results in Economics, the 
Minimax Theorem and the Nash Equilibrium are 
presented together with their mathematical 
fundaments. The results are obtained in the field of 
Functional Analysis.  
Keywords— Minimax Theorem, Nash Equilibrium.  
1. Introduction 
In this work it will be seen as the convex sets strict 
separation result allows obtaining a fundamental 
result in Game Theory: The Minimax Theorem. The 
mathematical structure considered is the real Hilbert 
spaces, see Ferreira et. al (2010).  
Then the same will be done for Nash Equilibrium 
using mainly Kakutani’s Theorem, see Kakutani 
(1941), Matos and Ferreira (2006) and Ferreira et. al 
(2010).       
2. Minimax Theorem 
The context considered is the one of the Games of 
two players with null sum: 
- Be  (   )  a two variables real function, 
        being   a real Hilbert space. 
 
- Be A and B two convex sets in H.  
 
- One of the players chooses strategies 
(points) in A in order to maximize  (   )  
(or minimize   (   )): it is a maximizing 
player.  
- The other player chooses strategies (points) 
in B in order to minimize  (   )  (or 
maximize   (   ) ): it is the minimizing 
player. 
 
The function  (   )  is the payoff function. 
 (     ) represents, simultaneously, the maximizing 
player gain and the minimizing player loss in a move 
where they choose, respectively, the strategies    and 
  . So the gain of one of the players is identical to the 
loss of the other. Because of it the game is said of 
null sum. 
In these conditions the game has value C if 
   
   
   
   
 (   )   
    
   
   
   
 (   )                                  (   ) 
 
If, for any (     )  (     )    (     )  is said 
to be a pair of optimal strategies. It will be also a 
saddle point if it verifies in addition  
 
 (    )   (     )   (    )      
                                           (   ) 
 
 
It is conceptually easy to generalize this situation to a 
n players null sum game, although algebraically 
fastidious.    
The fundamental result in this section is: 
Theorem 2.1 (Minimax Theorem) 
A and B are closed convex sets in H and A also 
limited.  (   ) is a real function defined for  x in A 
and y in B such that: 
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-  (  (   )      )  (  
 ) (    )    (    )  for x in A and 
       in B,        (that is:  (   ) is 
convex in y for each x), 
 
-  ((   )        )  (  
 ) (    )    (    )  for y in B and 
       in A,        (that is:  (   ) is 
concave in x for each y), 
 
-  (   ) is continuous in x for each y. 
 
So (2.1) holds, that is the game has a value. 
Demonstration: 
Beginning by the most trivial part of the 
demonstration:  
   
   
 (   )   (   )     
   
 (   ) 
and so 
   
   
   
   
 (   )     
   
   
   
 (   )  
 
Then, as  (   ) is concave and continuous in    , 
A convex, closed and limited, it follows that 
       (   )   .  
 
Be                (   )  
 
Suppose now that there is      such that 
 (    )   , for any y in B. In this case, 
       (    )                    (   )    
as it is convenient. Then the existence of such a    
will be proved. 
 
For any y in B, be    *     (   )   +  
   is closed, limited and convex. Suppose that, for a 
finite set (          ) ⋂      
 
   . Consider the 
transformation from A to    defined by  
 
 
 ( )  ( (    )     (    )       (    )
  )  
Call G the  ( )  convex hull closure. Be P the    
closed positive cone. Now it is shown  ⋂   : in 
fact, being  (   )  concave in x, for any    in A, 
                 ∑      
 
    
∑  ( (    )   )   (∑      
 
   
)   
 
   
 
and so the convex extension of  ( )  does not 
intersect P. 
Consider now a sequence    of elements of A, such 
that  (  ) converges for       . As A is closed, 
limited and convex, it is possible to define a 
subsequence, designated    such that    converges 
weakly for an element of A (call it   ). And, for any 
   as  (    ) is concave in x,  
   ̅̅̅̅̅ (     )   (     )     (  )
    ̅̅̅̅̅ (    )  
So  ⋂   . Then, G and P may be strictly 
separated, and it is possible to find a vector in    
with coordinates   , such that 
   
   
∑  ( (    )   )  ∑     
 
   
 
   
 
with the whole    greater or equal than zero. 
Obviously, the    cannot be simultaneously null. So 
dividing for ∑   
 
    and taking in account the 
convexity of  (   ) in y  
   
   
 (   ̅)             ̅  
∑     
 
   
∑   
 
   
  
 
And, evidently, or  ̅   or              (   )  
   This contradicts the definition of C. So, 
⋂   
 
   
    
In fact,  
⋂  
   
   
as it will be seen in the sequence using that result and 
proceeding by absurd. Note that    is a closed and 
convex set and so it is also weakly closed. And being 
bounded it is compact in the weak topology
1
, as A. 
Calling    the complement of    it results that    is 
open in the weak topology. So, if  
                                                          
1
 See, for instance, Kantorovich and Akilov (1982). 
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⋂       is empty, ⋂            But, being A 
compact, a finite number of     is enough to cover A: 
⋃      
 
   
 
that is: ⋂   
  
    is in the complement of A and so it 
must be  
⋂    
 
     , leading to a contradiction. 
Suppose then that    ⋂      . So, in fact    
satisfies  (    )   , as requested. 
Then it follows a Corollary of Theorem 2.1, obtained 
strengthening its hypothesis. 
Corollary 2.1 
Suppose that the functional  (   )  defined in 
Theorem 2.1 is continuous in both variables, 
separately, and that B is also limited. So, there is an 
optimal pair of strategies, with the property of being a 
saddle point. 
Demonstration: 
It was already seen that exists    such that  
 (    )                                                   (   ) 
  
for each y. As  (    ) is continuous in y and B is 
limited  
 
   
   
 (    )   (     )                         (   ) 
for any    in B
2
. But 
       (    )               (   )    and, so 
 
 (     )                                                      (   ) 
The saddle point property follows immediately from 
(2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) . 
 
3. Nash Equilibrium 
The formulation and resolution of a game is very 
important in Game Theory. There are several game 
                                                          
2 A continuous convex functional in a Hilbert space has 
minimum in any limited closed convex set.   
 
solution concepts. But some of these concepts are 
restrict to a certain kind of games. The most 
important solution concept was defined by John Nash 
(Nash, 1950). It will be seen that the Nash 
equilibrium existence is guaranteed for a large class 
of games.  
   is the finite set of available strategies for a player. 
The Cartesian product of these sets is denoted by E. 
A typical element of this set is   (           ), 
called a pure strategy profile, where each    is a pure 
strategy for player n. 
Definition 3.1 
A mixed strategy of a player n is a lottery over the 
pure strategies of player n.  
Observation: 
- One of player n’s mixed strategies is 
denoted    and the set of all player n’s 
mixed strategies is denoted   . 
 
- Thus    (  (  
 )   (  
 )     (  
  )) 
where    is the number of pure strategies of 
player n and   (  
 )               and 
∑   (  
 )    
  
    
 
- The Cartesian product            
   is the set of all mixed strategy profiles. 
 
- So, the mixed strategy set for each player is 
the probability distribution set over its pure 
strategy set. 
Definition 3.2 
A n-dimensional simplex defined by the      points 
           in  
       is denoted 〈          〉 
and is defined by the set 
{     ∑     ∑         
 
   
 
   
}  
Observation: 
- The simplex is non degenerate if the n 
vectors               are linearly 
independent. 
 
- If   ∑      
 
    the numbers      , …,    
are called the barycenter coordinates of x. 
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- The barycentre of the simplex 
〈          〉 is the point having the whole 
barycenter coordinates equal to (   )  . 
Definition 3.3 
Call   ( ) the expected payoff function of player n 
associated to the mixed strategy profile   
(          )  
Definition 3.4 
A Nash equilibrium of a game is a profile of mixed 
strategies   (          )  such that for each 
          for each    and   
  in   , if   (  )  
  then 
  (                         )
   (               
            )  
Observation: 
- So an equilibrium is a profile of mixed 
strategies such that a player knows what 
strategies the other players will go to 
choose, and no player has incentive to 
deviate from the equilibrium since that it 
cannot improve its payoff through an 
unilateral change of its strategy. 
 
- A Nash equilibrium induces a necessary 
condition of strategic stability. 
For the sequence it is necessary the following result: 
Theorem 3.1 (Kakutani) 
Let     be a compact convex set. Let      
an upper hemi-continuous convex valued 
correspondence. Then the correspondence F has a 
fixed point. 
Theorem 3.2 (Nash) 
The mixed extension of every finite game has, at 
least, one strategic equilibrium. 
Demonstration: 
Consider the set-valued mapping that maps each 
strategy profile, x, to all strategy profiles in which 
each player’s component strategy is a best response 
to x. That is, maximizes the player’s payoff given 
that the others are adopting their components of x. If 
a strategy profile is contained in the set to which it is 
mapped (is a fixed point) then it is an equilibrium. 
This is so because a strategic equilibrium is, in effect, 
defined as profile that is a best response it itself. 
Thus the  proof of existence of equilibrium amounts 
to a demonstration that the best response 
correspondence has a fixed point. The fixed – point 
theorem of Kakutani asserts the existence of a fixed 
point for every correspondence from a convex and 
compact subset of Euclidean space into itself, 
provided two conditions hold. One, the image of 
every set must be convex. And two, the graph of the 
correspondence (the set of pairs (x,y) where y is the 
image of x) must be closed. 
Now, in the mixed extension of a finite game, the 
strategies set of each player consists of all vectors 
(with as many components as there are pure 
strategies) of non negative numbers that sum to 1; 
that is, it is a simplex. Thus, the set of all strategy 
profiles is a product of simplexes. In particular, it is a 
convex and compact subset of Euclidean space. 
Given a particular choice of strategies by the other 
players, a player’s best responses consist of all 
(mixed) strategies that put positive weight on those 
pure strategies that highest expected payoff among all 
the pure strategies. Thus, the set of best responses is a 
sub simplex. In particular, it is convex.  
Finally, note that the conditions that must be met for 
a given strategy to be a best response to a given 
profile are all weak polynomial inequalities, so the 
graph of the best response correspondence is closed.  
Thus, all the conditions of Kakutani’s theorem hold, 
and this completes the proof of Theorem 3.2. 
4. Conclusions 
Minimax Theorem, see Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947), and Nash Equilibrium, see Nash (1951), were 
two main achievements that give raise to a great 
spread of the Game Theory Applications namely in 
the Economic Domain.  
Both concepts were not developed initially in a pure 
mathematical context. Only latter the problem of 
rigorous mathematic application to develop these 
results was considered. A simple and clear way to 
develop mathematically the Minimax Theorem may 
be seen in Brézis (1983). For the Nash Equilibrium 
see for instance Matos and Ferreira (2006) and 
Ferreira et. al (2010).  
The due value in practical applications was 
recognized to Minimax Theorem first than to the 
Nash Equilibrium. This one had in recent times 
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finally the deserved recognition with the award of the 
Economics Nobel Prize. 
It may be said that the Minimax Theorem is more 
considered in domains like Operations Research than 
in Economics. The opposite happens with the Nash 
Equilibrium. In particular in the famous Cournot-
Nash Model, among others. 
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